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A DEARTH OF KINDNESS: USING BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY TO
EVALUATE RAWLS, NOZICK, AND CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE
IDEOLOGY

James G. Wilson*
John Rawls and Robert Nozick’s pathbreaking books
established enduring parameters for mainstream political and
legal discourse. While the polarity can easily be exaggerated,
Democrats invoked Rawls’s extension of the New Deal while
Republicans gravitated towards Nozick’s libertarianism. This
essay argues that both approaches are valuable but incomplete.
Neither philosopher foresaw how centralized private power
could corrode republican norms and cripple the middle class.
The problem extends beyond material and political problems to
the “spiritual” issue of kindness. Because neither philosopher
adequately incorporated benevolence into their visions, they
failed to offer a path to a middle class republic that was not only
stable but also humane.

INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, the American philosophers John Rawls and
Robert Nozick reinvigorated Western political philosophy by
reimagining such classic tropes as “natural right,” “state of nature,”
and “social contract.” They are often perceived as polarities, using
different methodologies and perspectives to develop rival
conceptions of justice. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick was
fiercely libertarian,1 while in A Theory of Justice Rawls advocated
an expanded version of the New Deal that permits wealth disparity
so long as economic inequalities primarily benefit those who are
“worse off.”2
This Article’s primary criticism of both systems (and thus of
contemporary corporate ideology and neoclassical economics, to
the degree that they have similar viewpoints) is that they
*

1.
2.

Professor of Law, Cleveland Marshall College of Law.
See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 78–80 (1971).
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inadequately explore, reflect, and incorporate the full extent of
human nature, individually and collectively. By primarily utilizing
“self interest” to determine the scope of state coercive power, the
philosophers reinforced neoclassical economics’ circular argument
that individuals always “rationally” maximize personal
“preferences,” a technique that tends to exclude or obscure
important distinctions among emotions, motivations, and actions.3
Buddhist psychology provides the alternative perspective of
promoting kindness, an approach that may lead to greater social
and individual happiness (at least for many people). This critique
is far from absolute: we shall briefly explore both men’s analysis of
“love” and “benevolence” in the final section of this Article.
While vast differences between the two philosophers are about
as clear as anything can be in normative philosophy, this Article
explores how their two seminal works helped define, perhaps even
establish, the permissible parameters of moral discourse within the
American elite and intelligentsia (even if relatively few people ever
read those challenging books). Widespread acclaim in moral
reasoning often reflects (and causes) an emerging zeitgeist that uses
emergent philosophies for its own purposes. Thus, for the purposes
of this Article, it does not matter that both philosophers would
have rejected many subsequent interpretations, distortions, and
applications of their visions.
The ideologies of many powerful American actors and
institutions can be placed on a Rawls-Nozick spectrum. Supreme
Court Justice Kennedy exemplifies how the two philosophies can
be blended.
Kennedy has been pivotal in expanding the
constitutional rights of gay individuals,4 an anti-discrimination
principle that can be easily inferred from Rawls’s methodology. If
someone doesn’t know their sexual preference while contracting
behind Rawls’s “veil of ignorance,” they probably will opt for a
society
that
tolerates
non-coercive
sexual
proclivities.
Furthermore, consensual, adult sex satisfies Nozick’s libertarian
principles that only permit the State to regulate nonconsensual

3. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR (1976).
4. Kennedy’s defense of gay rights culminated in a five-to-four decision
establishing a constitutional right to gay marriage. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015).
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injuries.5 Kennedy has also been very libertarian when deciding
political economy cases, empowering corporations and wealthy
individuals in cases such as Citizens United.6
The major political parties can also be found along this
continuum. While the Democrats are somewhat more like Rawls
than their rivals in terms of income and wealth distribution, both
parties’ leadership have been strongly committed to Nozick’s
libertarianism as the economic default line: “free trade” and
“austerity” (for the masses) have been bipartisan mantras. Both
parties periodically alter the welfare state in either direction.
Presidents Bush and Obama worked with Congress to expand
health care for Americans,7 but Obama subsequently agreed with
House Republicans to curtail social welfare benefits, a deal the
Republicans ultimately rejected.8 Fortunately, Bernie Sanders’s
campaign and President Donald Trump’s views on international
trade9 reveal cracks in the intellectual monolith of neoliberalism
that arose during the Carter and Reagan administrations (the same
time as the publication of Rawls and Nozick’s famous books).
We can also place most contemporary corporate ideologies
within these boundaries. The Koch brothers and their plutocratic
allies are exceptionally libertarian,10 while Silicon Valley, Wall
Street, and many other major corporations pay more than lip
service to emerging anti-discrimination norms. To take a recent
example, the NCAA would not hold its annual basketball
tournament in North Carolina after that State’s legislature passed a
law discriminating against the LGBT community.11 Corporations
5. NOZICK, supra note 1, at ix.
6. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318 (2010).
7. President Bush signed a law subsidizing drugs for seniors. The Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355j (2003),
amended by 21 U.S.C. § 1102 (2003); 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2003), amended by §§ 1111–1118
(2003). President Obama signed a bill extending health insurance to millions. The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
8. Matt Bai, Obama v. Boehner: Who Killed the Debt Deal?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/magazine/obama-vs-boehner-who-killed
the-debt-deal.html [https://perma.cc/ZY5U-JRDW].
9. Nicky Woolf et al., Trump to Withdraw from Trans-Pacific Partnership on
First Day in Office, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us
news/2016/nov/21/donald-trump-100-days-plans-video-trans-pacific-partnership
withdraw [https://perma.cc/GGM2-V795].
10. See, e.g., JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2016).
11. Marc Tracy & Alan Blinder, N.C.A.A. Moves Championship Events From
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often support anti-discrimination principles (so long as those norms
are not extensively used against them): reduction of white male
privilege at non-leadership levels increases the competitive labor
force. Including a few minorities and women in leadership
positions creates a patina of Rawlsian legitimacy. Furthermore,
workers and consumers are more satisfied and productive when not
encountering flagrantly invidious discrimination. Why would
minorities prefer to buy products from an overtly racist
manufacturer when more civilized alternatives exist?
Corporations can thereby operate pursuant to a hybrid
political morality that exceeds undiluted self-interest, a move that
is not always purely cynical.12 Not every person or every institution
is relentlessly sociopathic; most people want a moral code, not just
for cover but also for self-rationalization and even for improving
the life of others. I have known many people who have worked for
corporate America; few are raging sociopaths. Most believe they
provide value to others within and outside their organization.
After all, two of the best things you can do for someone are to
create a good job opportunity and a good product.13
We should not be surprised that these two powerful
perspectives can be awkwardly integrated. They are nothing new.
The politics of wealth inequality were a major issue in ancient
Greek philosophy. Aristotle believed that a viable state had to be
more than a trading consortium: “the state is not a mere society,
having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual
crime and for the sake of exchange.”14 The State must also protect
the poor and the middle class from the ravenous rich.15 Jesus’s
egalitarianism and Kant’s categorical imperative16 challenged
North Carolina, Citing Anti-Gay-Rights Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/sports/ncaa-moves-championship-events-from
north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/UDY2-MDG7].
12. Rawls and Nozick’s seminal books may have also been popular for not
applying doctrines to such divisive issues as affirmative action or abortion. To broaden
their customer base and maintain employee loyalty, many corporations avoid partisan
politics and culture wars.
13. Conversely, one of the worst things you can do to fellow citizens and your
nation is move many decent jobs abroad.
14. ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986, 2032
(Jonathan Barnes ed., B. Jowett, trans., 1984).
15. Id. at 2041.
16. IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in KANT, POLITICAL
WRITINGS 131, 133 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans., 1991).
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invidious discriminations. Herbert Spencer was one of many who
advocated a minimal state.17
Of course, there is much truth in the Left’s frequently made
accusation that large corporate cultures are greedy, primarily
committed to increasing wealth, power, and income for
shareholders and management.18 Left-leaning scholars can cite
extensive conservative law and economics literature making the
same argument.
Indeed, some judges and conservative
19
economists believe corporations must maximize shareholder value
at the expense of everything else.20 That narrow perspective fails to
fully explain how many corporate actors evaluate their institution
or why many other citizens continue to support an economy
dominated by consolidated and centralized private power.
The Left’s harsh critique may also be politically
counterproductive as long as private corporations continue to
employ so many people and provide vast amounts of goods and
services at relatively low costs. If Leftists dismiss everyone who
works for corporations as alienated, deluded, or sociopathic, they
toss aside many potential allies. Eliminating all private control and
influence over the major modes of production would be a truly
revolutionary act that many people are not willing to risk.
Wherever economic power is located, there is the possibility of
abuse. Over the intermediate term (the next fifty years or so) the
least violent and disruptive path may be to weaken and
decentralize private power, not eliminate it. We would have the

17. HERBERT SPENCER, The Proper Sphere of Government, in SPENCER
POLITICAL WRITINGS 3, 6 (John Offer ed., 1994).
18. Sen. Bernie Sanders, Corporate Greed Must End, HUFFINGTON POST (June
24, 2015, 9:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/corporate
greed-must-end_b_7653442.html [https://perma.cc/QP68-KG37].
19. For a defense of maximizing shareholder value, see Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
20. Most courts believe corporations have a great flexibility under the business
judgment rule. The Supreme Court recently stated, “modern corporate law does not
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and
many do not do so.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014). Not
everyone agrees. In 2010, Delaware Chancellor Chandler wrote, “I cannot accept as
valid . . . a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to
maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders—no matter whether those stockholders are individuals of modest means
or a corporate titan of online commerce.” eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,
16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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benefits of competition, market-directed allocation of capital, and
some separation of political power from modes of production.
So what is morally troubling with the claim that corporate
ideology can be described as a blend of Rawls and Nozick? First,
Rawls and Nozick’s psychologies were a murky blend of insights
and misunderstandings. In particular, they did not fully understand
the meaning of “kindness,” thereby failing to appreciate its
essential role in creating a decent, viable society that promotes
individual well-being, diversity, and community. Employing the
metaphor of contract, which is usually associated with
maximization of self-interest, Rawls refined Kant’s chilly
categorical imperatives21 to defend the norms and institutions of
New Deal style liberalism,22 while Nozick interpreted those same
Kantian principles23 to strip J.S. Mill’s mature libertarian political
philosophy of its restraint and common sense.24 They made a
narrowly defined conception of self-interest the most dynamic
psychological assumption, following the highly rationalistic paths of
Hobbes and neoclassical economics.
Second, they tended to equate the meaning of justice with the
legitimate scope of state coercive power instead of also determining
the essential roles of private power and individual conscience in
creating and maintaining a just society. As a result, they did not
adequately explore the appropriate morality of individuals and
societies, some of the crucial relationships between state and
society, the full extent of human nature, effective paths to
happiness, and competing notions of vice or virtue. Finally, they
believed their work was complete once their idealized state was
operational; they did not employ the historical method to test their
institutional recommendations. These three weaknesses made it
relatively easy for the ruling class to pick and choose from their
21. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 251–57.
22. Id. at 258–65. Rawls’s two clusters of principles echoes the New Deal
Supreme Court’s conclusion that core civil rights should receive more constitutional
protection than economic and social controversies. See United States v. Carolene
Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
23. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 32.
24. Henry Sidgwick described how Mill shifted from all-encompassing
libertarianism to a more flexible approach: “[Mill] points out the error of demanding
that a political constitution be thoroughly logical, i.e., should exhibit in all its details the
application of some one fundamental principle.” Henry Sidgwick, Fitzjames Stephen
on Mill on Liberty, in ESSAYS ON ETHICS AND METHODS 181, 182 (Marcus G. Singer,
ed., 2000).
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philosophies to justify an emerging political economy based upon
increased centralized power, credit, technology, and military
assertiveness even though neither philosopher would approve of
the current system. Nozick would have been appalled by the
amount of transfer payments, while Rawls, already critical of
destabilizing inequalities,25 became increasingly critical of the
American economic system but failed to offer adequate solutions.
Like so many others, he emphasized campaign finance,26 which is
necessary but insufficient to alleviate accelerating wealth
inequality.
I.

A QUICK REVIEW OF RAWLS, NOZICK, AND THE BUDDHA

Rawls and Nozick turned to Immanuel Kant for two moral
principles that echoed the Golden Rule. The first was procedural:
rules can only be legitimate when universally applicable.27 Kant’s
second, substantive rule promoted “human dignity” and “personal
autonomy”28 by maintaining that we should treat other people not
solely as means but also as ends.29 Of course, Rawls’ and Nozick’s
radically divergent applications of Kant’s principles indicate both
philosophers used much more than pure reason to develop their
competing hypotheticals. Many moral theories can be “derived,”
“implied,” or “inferred” from Kant’s majestic generalities, but that
diverse outcome demonstrates that none can be “logically” proven.
For starters, there is no clear line distinguishing behavior that treats
people “solely as means” instead of as a mix of “ends” and
“means.”
25. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 284.
26. Id. at 407. Rawls made five specific proposals: public financing of elections,
fair equality of opportunity, decent distribution of wealth and income, society as
employer of last resort, and universal health care. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 407–08 (Expanded ed., 2005) [hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
Perhaps because this book began to address the threat of private power to republican
stability, Political Liberalism never had the influence of his earlier book.
27. KANT, supra note 16.
28. “Personal autonomy” and “human dignity” emphasize the isolated
individual. They don’t reflect humanity’s needs for interconnectedness. Theories that
focus predominately on individual human rights are much easier to integrate into
neoclassical economics, reduces all choices to individual preference gratification.
IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in
KANT, supra note 16, at 41, 42.
29. Professor Hans Reiss discussed how Kant’s various conceptions of the
categorical imperative supported freedom. Hans Reiss, Introduction to Immanuel
Kant, in KANT, supra note 16, at 1, 18–28.
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A. Rawls
Rawls believed everyone would consent to his version of the
state once placed behind a “veil of ignorance” that prevented them
from knowing their complete ideologies, personality traits,
biological characteristics, and historical circumstances: “I shall even
assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good
or their special psychological propensities.”30
For instance,
everybody would oppose sexist or racist systems because they could
no longer discern their gender or race. Who would want to risk the
chance of losing the genetic lottery in a society based upon race
slavery? Anyone might be a member of an impoverished family, so
contractors would want their family’s basic needs met and have
Rawls’ recommended “fair equality of opportunity.”31
Based upon “rational self-interest,” they would unanimously
adopt Rawls’s elaborate, two-tiered system of rights.32 The first
cluster of rights strongly protects basic civil liberties, precludes
invidious discrimination, and provides for necessities. The second,
subordinate set of rights establishes a “fair equality of opportunity”
and a “Difference Principle” that permits wealth disparity so long
as that difference improves the lives of the “worst off” by providing
incentives to others who will work harder and thus provide more
value to themselves and the “least favored.”33
Rawls offered the reader a process to verify his method and
recommendations; we should engage in “reflective equilibrium”
after lifting the veil.34 He claimed people would recognize that his
disembodied requirements were not all that different than their
existing beliefs about social and economic justice.35 In other words,

30. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 12. We shall see that Rawls sometimes seemed to
import some conception of kindness into his model when he explored the “good.”
31. Id. at 83–90.
32. Id. at 139. In later works, Rawls concluded that his system would not
generate unanimity because his approach was less universal than he thought. In other
words, he had processed a humane, liberal perspective though a system that generated
humane, liberal outcomes. Perhaps the most frustrating moment in A Theory of
Justice arose when he did not describe in detail how he derived his two clusters of
principles from his methodology: “I shall not, of course, actually work through this
process.” RAWLS, supra note 2, at 21. A more detailed description of his derivation of
particular substantive rules from his predominately procedural system would have been
illuminating.
33. Id. at 302–03.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 48–49.
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his two clusters of principles confirmed and reflected America’s
evolving social norms protecting fundamental civil rights, opposing
invidious discrimination, and providing assistance to the poor.
However, even a sympathetic observer may reflect his or her way
to significantly different structures of rights and privileges. For
instance, it is not clear why a “fair equality of opportunity” should
be treated differently than satisfaction of basic needs. Obviously, a
person cannot function effectively if they are hungry or homeless,
but most people are effectively excluded from full citizenry if they
don’t have a real chance at upward mobility.
Rawls asserted that his contractors would not allow egoism to
influence their system of justice,36 but it was fairly easy for others to
conclude that some degree of egoism is permissible while
contracting or during the subsequent of reflective equilibrium.
This move became even easier once Rawls subsequently conceded
that his application of his method required that contractors have “a
certain psychological nature.”37
They could take his basic
structure—which is very individual-rights oriented and relatively
unconcerned about kindness, either private or institutionalized, to
create a more selfish version as their moral baseline.
Rawls almost certainly would have rejected the methods and
outcomes of this neoliberal reconstruction project. Although he
rarely discussed wealth in Theories of Justice, he assumed great
wealth and income inequalities would not exist38 (and seemed to
implicitly assume such disparities would not arise under his
system). In later writings, he was very critical of concentrated
wealth and income that could lead to “political domination.”39
B. Nozick
Nozick extrapolated a doctrine of individual sovereignty that
he believed was consistent with Kant’s two core principles.
Individual property rights arose before any consensual social
contract, creating an inalienable baseline.40 Thus, he did not
36. Id. at 136.
37. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 370.
38. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 158.
39. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 44 (2001)
[hereinafter JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].
40. See NOZICK, supra note 1, at 151. These natural property rights are often
described as “Lockean.” However, Locke never thought natural rights remained
absolute. His social contract entrusted many rights to a legislative sovereign
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consider Rawls’s social contractual “consent” to be the primary
legitimating factor. Unlike Rawls, Nozick reimagined the “State of
Nature” in some detail, maintaining that every individual has many
natural rights that can never be violated; those rights can only be
relinquished or altered by express consent. There are three
legitimate ways to obtain and retain property: every individual has
an unlimited right to create wealth, contract for it, or receive it as a
gift.41 Thus, “absolute” individual property rights predate all
contracts, personal or social.42 By not divesting individuals of
actual histories, skills, and wealth, Nozick argued that his
“entitlement” approach better defends and promotes personal
autonomy and dignity than Rawls’s more disembodied social
contract.
Rawls’s vision—that people only agree after no longer
knowing who they are—does seem a bit strange, which makes one
wonder who or what is actually agreeing to anything. On the other
hand, Nozick made his philosophy more vulnerable by imagining a
complex social evolution from the original State of Nature to his
recommended “minimal state” that only had the authority to
protect individual property rights from internal or external threats.
Nozick claimed that individuals could initially defend
themselves and their property by purchasing coercive services from
private “protection agencies.”43 Otherwise, they risked unjustified
loss from predators or rivals who would make biased decisions due
to self-interest. Over time, a “dominant protective agency” would
emerge that offered the best procedures to resolve disputes and the
most resources to defend its members.44 This organization would
eventually capture the market, evolving into an “ultraminimal
state” that regulated all disputes within a territory so long as
nonmembers were compensated for any loss.45 The private
representing the will of the majority. This power was based upon another Natural Law
that contemporary conservative libertarians ignore: “[T]he first and fundamental
natural Law, which is to govern even the Legislative it self, is the preservation of the
Society, and (as far as will consist with the publick good) of every person in it.” JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 355, 401 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960). In other
words, his book is as much a defense of legislative sovereignty and the right to revolt if
that legislative power is abused, as it is a defense of individual property rights.
41. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 151.
42. Id. at 151.
43. Id. 12–15.
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id. at 26–28, 73–84.
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organization next mutated into a more precisely defined “minimal
state,” which only has authority to protect individuals from internal
violence, fraud, contractual violations, and external threats. Nozick
asserted this property-based approach surpassed Rawls’s
contractually based hypothetical because of its historical roots: real
people retain existing “entitlements” they actually earned in the
past. In other words, Rawls’s system failed to provide individuals
with Kantian dignity.46
Nozick’s elaborate mythology apparently makes five
interrelated points: (1) private market systems can adequately
regulate coercion; (2) a minimal state can emerge out of individual
contracts; (3) individuals never need relinquish any natural rights
to preserve all their property when joining a state or society; (4) as
a result, the newly formed state gains no additional powers beyond
protecting pre-existing individual rights, no “attributes of
sovereignty”; and (5) consequently, the State has no legitimate
capacity to take wealth from one person and give it to another
(except to maintain the minimal state).
As always seems to be the case with heroic attempts to create
a comprehensive political system based upon a single principle or
methodology, the inevitable exceptions—created by necessity and
tragedy—partially undermine the edifice, particularly to the extent
that it claims to be “absolute,” “scientific,” and/or “logically
reasoned.” For example, Nozick claimed the “minimal protection
agency” can become a legitimate “dominant protection agency” so
long as it appropriately seizes property from nonmembers while
providing compensation. If so, what became of the inalienable
right to property?47 Next, if the minimal state cannot take any
property without express individual consent, where and when did it
obtain the authority to seize some individual property from
wealthier individual members to protect others within its
jurisdiction?48 Nozick also created exceptions for “catastrophes”49

46. See id. at 213–14.
47. See Eric Mack, Nozickian Arguments for the More-Than-Minimal State, in
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NOZICK’S ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 89, 100
(Ralf M. Bader and John Meadowcroft, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
48. See id. at 108–09.
49. David Schmidtz wondered how Nozick could draw lines after creating a
“catastrophe” exception. See David Schmidtz, The Right to Distribute, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NOZICK’S ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, supra note
47 at 197, 225 n.13.
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and extremely scarce goods—such as ownership of the only water
well in a village.50 Such exceptions intimate additional “attributes
of sovereignty.” What if one believes that severe wealth inequality
is catastrophic for any republic?
Both men relied upon truncated historical analysis. Nozick
incorporated the past when establishing the initial extent of
property rights.
While Rawls initially stripped his social
contractors of any historical knowledge, he brought historical
awareness back when encouraging readers to compare his
proposals with their pre-existing views through “reflective
equilibrium,” a method that included “the tradition of moral
philosophy and any further ones that occur to us.”51 However, both
men failed to consult history to determine what forces might
undermine their proposed systems. Quite simply, neither man
adequately addressed Aristotle’s concern that, based upon
historical experience, the wealthy tend to band together to plunder
the middle class and poor through systemic corruption, creating
widespread discontent that usually leads to demagoguery and
despotism (a fear that the Clintons’ corrupt accumulation of wealth
and the racially inflammatory campaign of President Donald
Trump has validated).
In particular, neither philosopher
considered the threat of centralized private power to individual
happiness, social cohesion, and republican stability.
Rawls
incorrectly assumed “that in a competitive economy (with or
without private ownership) with an open class system excessive
inequalities will not be the rule.”52
More generally, they did not incorporate Aristotle’s definition
of a country’s “constitution” as its distribution of power and
wealth.53 Any “theory of justice” that primarily explores the
appropriate extent of coercive public power and fails to consider
the significance of private wealth distribution and income
inequality is incomplete. Furthermore, their focus on consent,
rationality, and human autonomy tends to put environmental

50. Peter Vallentyne thought this exception demonstrated that “ownership in
external objects is never full.” Peter Vallentyne, Nozick’s Libertarian Theory of Justice
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NOZICK’S ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA,
supra note 47 at 145, 162.
51. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 48–53.
52. Id. at 158.
53. ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, at 2030.
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concerns in the background.54 If one believes that our species faces
profound environmental risks, some of which may destroy us, then
any theory of justice must discuss limitations on human power as
well as methods to increase human autonomy and happiness.
We can more effectively achieve a humane, stable society by
first embracing the full complexity of human nature and then
utilizing the two Kantian abstractions as helpful, secondary tools.55
I prefer to start any “state of nature” or “social contract” analysis
with Hobbes’s darker version of human nature.56 Next, to soften
Hobbes’s incoherent opposition to rebellion,57 include Locke’s
“right to revolt”;58 include Rousseau’s more historically accurate
claims that dangerously unequal and unjust distributions of wealth
in the state of nature created the need for a state, but are likely to
be domesticated and continued within any state;59 and finally,
supplement that coercive system with a political economy and a
society based upon kindness as well as production.
Hobbes began with human passions instead of two inspiring
Kantian principles that allegedly can be applied dispassionately and
“rationally.” The three human motives of competition, diffidence,
and glory60 pressure us into joining a state. People competitively
seek gain at the expense of others; they fear others will take their
property; and some have an overwhelming desire to be
acknowledged as superior to the rest. These interpersonal impulses
are so dangerously compelling that “consent” may be theoretically
voluntary but is functionally required. In other words, humans are
under tremendous external and internal pressures to collaborate
with others out of self-defense: consent is all but “coerced” because
54. Rawls discussed future generations at some length. RAWLS, supra note 2, at
284–293. Social contract theories tend to be human-focused in process and outcome.
Only humans can reason well enough to form contracts and social contract theories are
usually offered to improve the human condition.
55. Whatever else Rawls and Nozick accomplished, they demonstrated how
quickly people can diverge when developing “secondary principles” from a few general
Kantian norms.
56. Hobbes began his section on Commonwealths by observing that men
“naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others.” THOMAS HOBBES, THE
LEVIATHAN 223 (C.B. Macpherson, ed., 1968) (1651).
57. LOCKE, supra note 40, at 406–28.
58. Id.
59. Victor Gourevitch, Introduction, in ROUSSEAU, THE DISCOURSES AND
OTHER EARLY POLITICAL WRITINGS ix, xxiii (Victor Gourevitch, ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1997).
60. HOBBES, supra note 56, at 185.
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we otherwise face the internal threats of violent anarchy and crime
and/or the external threat of conquest. If I am coerced when
handing over money to an armed thief, I am quasi-coerced when
delegating forcible power to a state to protect me from such
robbers. In both situations, threats of violence were major motives
for consent.
C. The Buddha
Ever since Descartes famously wrote, “I think, therefore I
am,” Western philosophy has been extremely individualistic, often
degenerating into alienating despair or addictive consumption.
Even if one does not accept the Buddha’s moral code, his
techniques, or his vision of permanent enlightenment, he
developed a balanced, interdependent psychology. He believed we
suffer by becoming entangled in a web of attachment, aversion, and
delusion.61
Hobbes and many others would acknowledge
attachment and aversion, which are self-interest’s positive and
negative preferences. But what is the meaning of “delusion?”
Based upon personal experience, the Buddha perceived that people
ignorantly cling to pleasures and obsess about past and present
threats and injuries.62 From this perspective, a leader like Adolph
Hitler was profoundly miserable, because that villain foolishly lived
in a world drenched with hatred, greed, and the lust for glory.
The Buddha provided a way out of this tar pit. Kindness is a
crucial component, creating a purpose beyond self-gratification.
We learn to accept pains and enjoy pleasures without becoming
psychologically ensnared by life’s inevitable fluctuations,
uncertainties, and eventual demise. We first undermine unhappy
delusions by acting generously.63 Giving time or property to others
reduces the tendency to cling, to optimize personal wellbeing. You
may notice internal resistance when you offer to help someone:
that anxious tug comes from our desperate, aggrandizing part of
consciousness. Generosity is also a socially cohesive act; kindness
becomes an ethical obligation and a source of spiritual growth. We
61. THE BUDDHA, Other Sects, in THE NUMERICAL DISCOURSES OF THE
BUDDHA 289–94 (Bhikkhu Bodhi trans., Wisdom Publications 2012).
62. THE BUDDHA, Setting in Motion the Wheel of the Dhamma, in THE
CONNECTED DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA 1843, 1844 (Bhikkhu Bodhi trans.,
Wisdom Publications 2000).
63. THE BUDDHA, Giving, in THE NUMERICAL DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA
supra note 61, at 899.
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next decide to live by a basic moral code based upon the principle
of not harming others.64
We express kindness to others and ourselves in four ways,
which the Buddha called the “four pāramitās.”65 First, we become
friendlier; instead of hating others and ourselves for inevitable
fallibilities, we try to respond with warm gentleness.66 Second, we
celebrate others’ success instead of being envious.
Most
importantly, we compassionately act to alleviate other beings’
suffering. From the perspective of political philosophy, compassion
is the most important factor. It is not enough to achieve personal
enlightenment, or to tolerate others by adopting narrow
conceptions of universality, human dignity, and autonomy. One
has to get off the couch and actively alleviate other beings’ misery.
We approach these tasks with equanimity and a humble sense
of our limited powers and responsibilities—as well as an
understanding of every creature’s sovereignty. To make the point
most bleakly, it is possible our species is making this planet
uninhabitable for large species, perhaps for life itself. While this
outcome is apocalyptic, I try to contemplate that future barren
landscape with tender sadness. There is little one can do to control
the mysterious flow of life. I care for living beings and their life
force, but I cannot control anyone’s happiness or unhappiness
(including my own). After all, there is life and thus there is hope.
Regardless of whether life is ultimately absurd, each of us must
decide to live only for ourselves or also for other beings. Whether
one agrees with the Buddha’s solutions or not, kindness is needed
to prevent the psychological forces of greed, fear, and delusion
from corroding our society. Thus, his general psychology as well as
his detailed description of decency provide a useful template for
evaluating not only individuals but also societies.
Neoclassical economic psychology, the intellectual bulwark of
contemporary corporate America, can awkwardly fold this analysis
back into their conception of homo economicus, a creature that
64. See DALAI LAMA, HOW TO PRACTICE: THE WAY TO A MEANINGFUL LIFE
27 (Jeffrey Hopkins ed. trans., Pocket Books 2002).
65. Hobbes recommended society was quite civilized and humane, premised
upon a version of Kant’s categorical imperative: A man should “be contented with so
much liberty against other men, as he would other men against himself[].” HOBBES,
supra note 56, at 190.
66. This Article’s shifting moods—anger, despair, and gentleness—indicates its
author’s limited commitment to Buddhist moral precepts and philosophical doctrines.
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exclusively maximizes personal preferences.67 Admittedly, there is
no way to refute the argument that you do what you want to do,
but that circular argument does not determine what a human
should choose to do. Kindness and generosity can often be in one’s
self interest. Indeed, there is growing scientific research supporting
the proposition that generous people are usually happier than
misers.68
However, people also make sacrifices and act according to a
sense of duty, knowing their actions increase their pain and
suffering or could terminate their life. When someone spends vast
amounts of time and resources raising his or her child or nursing an
adult relative, do they not experience a mix of love, gratification,
duty, irritation, and sacrifice? Words like “endurance,” “fatalism,”
and “obligation” often better describe the human condition than
“happiness,” “enlightenment,” or “maximization of preferences.”
At some point, generosity and kindness can be seen as existential
gestures, defiant refusals to let death’s inevitable triumph and
humanity’s anxieties turn oneself into a craven, self-absorbed
addict of distracting pleasure. We either take the path in Camus’s
The Stranger, committing murder because of life’s apparent
absurdity,69 or we emulate Camus’s doctor in The Plague, doggedly
trying to help even when our actions seem futile.70 One response to
a possible global holocaust is to capitulate; another is to try to
prevent nuclear war and environmental collapse, knowing that our
tiny influence may be fruitless.
What can we infer from these musings? At a minimum, we
shouldn’t evaluate politics and ethics exclusively from the internal
point of view of neoclassical economics, the intellectual
superstructure that defends existing distributions of private power
by reducing all emotions, values, and actions to one sterile, equal
dimension which is then monetized. However, if one wants to
describe human’s internal choice mechanism, there is a
fundamental moral indifference to others whenever one decides to

67. Homo Economicus, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homo_
economicus [https://perma.cc/LL5W-FYP2].
68. CHRISTIAN SMITH & HILARY DAVIDSON, THE PARADOX OF GENEROSITY:
GIVING WE RECEIVE, GRASPING WE LOSE 1–6 (2014).
69. See generally ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Mathew Ward, trans.,
1988).
70. See generally ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE (Stuart Gilbert, trans., 1948).
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be greedy, cruel, indifferent, or kind.71 Even if one concedes that
Mother Teresa and Stalin equally maximized preferences to
achieve their chosen conception of the “good,” their emotions,
motives, choices, and actions are morally distinguishable. We
should be wary of any philosophical system built exclusively (or
excessively) upon the inevitable human motivations of selfpreservation and self-interest.
II. THE EMOTIONAL LANDSCAPES OF RAWLS, NOZICK,
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS, AND CORPORATE IDEOLOGY
This section explores the emotional universes of Rawls,
Nozick, and corporate America by using the Buddha’s conceptions
of fear, greed, delusion, and kindness.
A. Aversion and Fear
John Locke’s natural rights extended far beyond “property”—
comprehending every person’s basic rights: “Life, the Liberty,
Health, Limb, or the Goods of another.”72 We need life, liberty,
and bodily integrity73 to enjoy personal and real property. Most of
us want to be safe—keeping what we own as well as having an
opportunity to gain more. Thus, any defense of property is based
upon the simultaneous tugs of attachment and fear. However, this
can eventually degenerate into compulsive greed and self-righteous
paranoia.
1.

Nozick

Like Hobbes and Nozick, we begin the quest for a just and
decent society in a fearful state of nature. In his book, Nozick
mentioned fear seventeen times while discussing anarchy and the
state, but never mentioned that emotion when later exploring
71. Heavily influenced by Eastern thought, Schopenhauer criticized Kant and
Fichte for emphasizing egoism over decency. Fichte wrote: “To act in accordance with
the impulse of sympathy, compassion, and philanthropy is not moral at all, but is to that
extent contrary to morals[!]”
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE BASIS OF
MORALITY 117 (E.F.J. Payne, trans., 1995). Schopenhauer believed the opposite: “The
absence of all egoistic motivation is, therefore, the criterion of an action of moral
worth.” Id. at 140 (italics in original). Thus, the moral worth of an act “can lie only in
its reference to others.” Id. at 142.
72. LOCKE, supra note 40, at 271.
73. See generally Sheldon Gelman, “Life” and “Liberty”: Their Original
Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate Over
Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1994).
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utopia. For instance, he defined general criminal prohibitions as
“public wrongs” because compensation for intentional injury
cannot rectify the widespread apprehension to victims and nonvictims that would arise if attackers could simply paid
compensatory damages to directly injured victims through a tort
system.74
Nozick tried to narrow fear’s scope (and thus its authority) by
claiming that “[f]ear is not a global emotion; it focuses on parts of
packages, independently of ‘on-balance’ judgments about the
whole.”75 This sentence is hard to decipher because the phrase
“global emotion” is unclear. All emotions are transitory, but often
overwhelming in the moment. More importantly, anxiety cannot
be precluded from innumerable “on balance judgments about the
whole.”76 We should be very worried that our global culture may
culminate in nuclear war while generating destabilizing wealth
inequality, religious conflict, and environmental catastrophes in the
meantime.
Nozick next turned this strange psychological
conception of “global emotions” into a crucial component of his
system: “Our present argument for the compensation of
compensable border crossings rests on the non-global character of
fear, anxiety, apprehension, and the like.”77 Invasive actions should
be compensated whether fear is global or not. Furthermore,
Nozick had earlier argued that society should prohibit assaults
because they generate widespread fear to victims and everyone
else, an outcome that seems “global.”78 However one resolves his
muddled psychology, the Hobbesian fear of others seems like a
reasonable “on balance judgment about the whole.”79
Nozick reflected upon fear in other puzzling ways. He

74. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 66–68.
75. Id. at 71.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. This criticism might miss understand his point, perhaps Nozick is only
wrestling with the question he asked at the beginning of the paragraph, wondering if
someone should be afraid even if he (or she) knew he would receive more than
adequate compensation for his (or her) injury. At least for me, this sort of fogginess
permeates the book. I am torn between two maxims: Bob Dylan sang, “[d]on’t criticize
what you can’t understand,” BOB DYLAN¸ The Times They Are a-Changin’, on THE
TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1964), while Edmund Burke
concluded, “[t]hat where I am ignorant I am diffident.” EDMUND BURKE, A LETTER
TO THE SHERIFFS OF BRISTOL 35 (JAMES HUGH MOFFATT eds, 1904).
79. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 71.
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concluded that societies may compensate people for “unfeared
actions,” which create “great benefits.”80 It is hard to distinguish
between “feared” and “unfeared actions” that injure others, much
less to determine “great benefits.” Nozick’s solution was an
economic balancing analysis that turned his allegedly inalienable
property rights into an external model that created a wealthdistribution “pattern:”
The most efficient policy foregoes the fewest net beneficial acts;
it allows anyone to perform an unfeared action without prior
agreement, provided the transaction costs of reaching a prior
agreement are greater, even by a bit, than the costs of posterior
compensation process.81

This Coasian balancing of interests suggests that railroad
engines can throw sparks on neighboring farmers’ crops, as long as
the railroads’ “great benefits” outweigh the costs. Once again,
Nozick moved from an absolutist theory of property rights to the
less theoretical, but more flexible approach of English Common
Law. For centuries, nuisance law has balanced interests to limit
individuals’ usage of their real property. Neither the farmer nor his
neighbor has absolute property rights.82
Even if the above account of fear can be resolved, clarified, or
even dismissed as secondary to his overall thesis, Nozick
acknowledged that fear is the primary source of the minimal state’s
ascendance. Some private protective associations will frighten the
populace: “If the independent’s procedure is very unreliable and
imposes high risk on others (perhaps he consults tea leaves), then if
he does it frequently, he may make all fearful, even those not his
victims.”83 The “dominant protective association” becomes a
“minimal state” by its eliminating fear-generating competitors: “If
done frequently enough, such unreliable enforcement may be
forbidden in order to avoid the general uncompensated-for fear.”84
80. Id. at 73.
81. Id.
82. Blackstone believed that an existing landowner could prevent a neighbor
from polluting the air but a new purchaser could not. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *402. This “right of first use” later became a factor in a balancing test
that weighed a variety of individual and social costs and benefits. See Carpenter v.
Double R Cattle Co., 669 P.2d 643, 655 (Idaho App. 1983), rev’d, 701 P.2d 222 (1985).
83. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 88.
84. Id. at 105. It is worth noting that one group is coercively preventing another
group from providing a service.
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Overall, Nozick’s theory of fear seems obscure, internally
inconsistent, and a threat to his libertarian vision. Isn’t “general
uncompensated-for fear” a “global emotion” that influences “on
balance judgments about the whole?” Far more importantly, if
someone joins a state and society to reduce fear of exploitation,
why should all reasonable fears evaporate after the minimal state is
created? What if one agrees with Aristotle and most other
republican theorists that massive wealth inequality exacerbates
class tensions, weakens the middle class, degrades the populace,
and eventually leads to class war and dictatorship? The fear of
environmental collapse is the ultimate global fear. We need
extensive, detailed statutory prohibitions, not just the piecemeal,
random tort system that Nozick recommended.85 In other words,
many of us have post-minimal state anxieties, requiring state action
far beyond Nozick’s prevention of limited “public wrongs” as
criminal or fraudulent behavior.
2.

Rawls

Rawls not only stripped his social contractors of any personal
knowledge when they negotiated behind his “veil of ignorance,”
but also eliminated fear and greed: “the Kantian interpretation of
the original position means that the desire to do what is right and
just is the main way for persons to express their nature as free and
equal rational beings.”86 In fact, “[a]nxiety and fear are not moral
feelings at all . . . .”87 Thus, Hobbes and Nozick’s psychologically
based jurisprudences become irrelevant. Before and after the
ratification of the social contract, Rawls’s contractors and reflectors
never had the unfortunate human emotions and motives that often
lead us to often rip each other apart. Nor is it clear which social
emotions count as “moral feelings.” If one applies Hume’s famous
distinction between “is” and “ought” whenever intellectual
confusion arises, doesn’t it seem more accurate to describe “moral
feelings” as any emotion that triggers a sense of ought—what
Hume called the “moral sense?” Doesn’t fear play a role as much
as greed, delusion, kindness, or rationality? Hume believed
humanity’s “moral sense” emerges out of fear, interest, and
sympathy. We are likely to agree with Rawls’s anti-discrimination
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 79–81.
RAWLS, supra note 2, at 445.
Id. at 481.

A DEARTH OF KINDNESS

2017]

519

principles, not just because they are “fair,” but also because we fear
exploitation by others after the veil of ignorance is lifted. While we
can and should deter some actions triggered by inappropriate
motives, it is dangerous to rely upon a moral theory of psychology
that excludes major emotions. Fear is often an appropriate
reaction, a valid preference that should be part of any moral and
social code.
Fear makes its first, somewhat puzzling appearance in Rawls’s
exploration of the “rule of law,” a norm that arises after the basic
social contract has been developed and ratified: “The boundaries of
our liberty are uncertain. And to the extent that this is so, liberty is
restricted by a reasonable fear of its exercise.”88 Two pages later,
he viewed the relationship between fear and liberty more
absolutely: “While a coercive mechanism is necessary, it is
obviously essential to define precisely the tendency of its
operations . . . . One who complies with the announced rules need
never fear an infringement of his liberty.”89 How can coercive
operations be defined precisely when liberty’s boundaries are
uncertain?
3.

Contemporary Corporate Culture

Many, if not most, large corporations trade in fear, greed, and
delusion. Some of them, such as Costco90 and Starbucks, try to
provide good jobs, decent benefits to employees, and worthwhile
products to consumers. Unless we want to forgo the vast benefits
of the Industrial Revolution, society needs large, productive
institutions that can accumulate enough capital to invest in
technology and employ a well-educated workforce. Up to some
uncertain point, I believe private property, market systems, division
of labor, and economies of scale provide more material benefits
than costs.
Libertarians fear public power far more than private power.91
88. Id. at 239.
89. Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
90. Rick Ungar, Walmart Pays Workers Poorly and Sinks While Costco Pays
Workers Well and Sails-Proof That You Get What You Pay For, FORBES (Apr. 17,
2013, 10:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2013/04/17/walmart-pays
workers-poorly-and-sinks-while-costco-pays-workers-well-and-sails-proof-that-you-get
what-you-pay-for/#6482fc38bc3d [https://perma.cc/HX6C-9EAV].
91. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN WITH ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM (40th anniversary ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 2002).
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Yet history consistently demonstrates that private power easily
collaborates with, and even seizes control of, public power,
whatever its internal structure. In other words, an unregulated
private sector is always likely to regulate the public sector for its
own interests, violating Nozick’s libertarian principles opposing
corporate welfare and crony capitalism.
There are innumerable examples of corporate capture. The
American political economy has revived Nozick’s “private
protective agencies.” Currently, millions of Americans work as
private security officers. More disturbingly, private corporations
operate one of the state’s primary coercive functions—
incarceration.92 Not only are these private prisons expensive, but
they also become a vested interest for excessive criminalization of
nonviolent activities. The failed War on Drugs employs many
people within the criminal justice system, creating perpetual
tensions between the populace and the police and a source of
outlandish profits.93
President Eisenhower’s dreaded “military-industrial complex”
perpetually promotes war. Because of concerns about terrorism,
this system has expanded into a vast “military-surveillance
industrial complex.”
Sadly, no political philosopher in the
Hobbesian tradition can be a pacifist, but Hobbes—who translated
Thucydides’s The Peloponnesian War94—must have agreed with
the great historian’s grisly description of Athenian decline through
imperial overreach.
Hobbes also warned that corporations
resemble “worms” within the Leviathan’s intestines: they can
devour the state from within.95
Media corporations promote and sell many modes of fear.
When the nation was veering leftward in the 1960s, the mass media
focused on local murders and crimes. This bloody journalism
aggravated class and racial animus, stimulated mass incarceration,

92. Private Prisons, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_prison
[https://perma.cc/UVF9-QGEX].
93. If I were on the Supreme Court, I would be inclined to hold that private
prisons are unconstitutional, because neither states nor the federal government should
be permitted to delegate such fundamental aspects of sovereignty to private
organizations.
94. THUCYDIDES WITH DAVID GRENE, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: THE
COMPLETE HOBBES TRANSLATION (Thomas Hobbes trans., Univ. of Mich. Press
1959) (1989).
95. HOBBES, supra note 56, at 375.
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and led many parents to not let their children play outside without
supervision. Consequently, many children didn’t learn how to play
with their neighbors and became excessively wary of strangers.
The entertainment industry’s festival of gore and vindictive
violence reinforces this nation’s tendency to prefer force instead of
diplomacy. Excessive fear of death creates a huge medicalindustrial complex that extracts trillions by keeping miserable
people alive for a few more months.
Unremitting advertising campaigns manipulate consumers’
insecurities. Aside from using apprehension to sell such products
as insurance policies and guns, every advertising campaign
intimates that the consumer is underperforming and unsatisfied.
We may have body odor or be uncool because we don’t own some
object, or haven’t travelled to some locale populated by models
whose beauty is yet another indictment of our mediocrity.
B. Greed and Addiction
Neither author mentioned greed in their two books, but
Nozick referred to “desire” twenty-eight times and “preference”
seventy times, while Rawls used “desire” 115 times and
“preference” in sixty-six places. Desire and preference are more
neutral, neoclassical economic concepts, while “greed” is a
judgmental term, connoting an excessive desire that injures self
and/or others. Aristotle warned that pursuit of excess wealth was a
threat to self, community, and republic.96 Perhaps Rawls relied
more than Nozick on economic terminology because Nozick’s
model was more abstractly Kantian. By immediately assuming that
a libertarian state best promoted human dignity and autonomy,
Nozick did not have as great a need to fully explore human
psychology, questions of economic efficiency, or any particular
conception of the “good.”
1.

Nozick

Nozick’s defense of the minimal state brims over with
powerful libertarian arguments. For example, he supplemented the
economists’ efficiency-equilibrium argument with the insightful
observation that it is hard for anyone to determine one’s own
96. Aristotle believed a middle class republic was the most stable, because the
rich tended to exploit and enrage the poor, who were normally content with their
limited property. ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, at 2058–59.
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preferences without also determining how much others are willing
to pay to fulfill their different desires: “Distribution according to
benefits to others is a major patterned strand in a free capitalist
society . . . .”97 For example, a person might prefer to play video
games all day, but those preferences are likely to change once the
video-game player learns that few people will pay for those skills.
Another virtue of the market system is its neutrality towards
people’s different desires: “It reflects and transmits widely
scattered information via prices, and coordinates persons’
activities.”98
According to Nozick, desire only becomes problematic when a
government exceeds the minimal state. While we are entitled to
pursue our goals by joining any group we want, we cannot
imperialistically use the state or that group to impose a “version of
unity” on other people.99 Once the state exceeds its Nozickian
jurisdiction (even if only to help the poor), economically powerful
people will seek and obtain political power to transfer wealth to
themselves. Nozick was aware that centralized private power could
undermine the libertarian state but had no democratic solution to
the dilemma.
Even if markets somehow efficiently maintain a perpetual,
desirable equilibrium, it does not follow that unregulated markets
can preserve Nozick’s political equilibrium. In the real world,
economic power becomes political power. Even in a minimal state,
arms merchants will promote war. Although I am wary to claim
that a formal or logical “contradiction” exists in libertarian
thought, there is a vast amount of historical evidence supporting
Aristotle’s prediction that excessive private power eventually seizes
control of any state. “The few,” forever insatiable, will never feel
bound by Nozick’s principles. We need public laws—particularly
robust anti-trust laws and tax laws—to prevent private power’s
triumph. Only a non-minimal state can prevent private actors from
obtaining the power to undermine valid libertarian and republican
ideals and institutions.
Aristotle observed that the rich and the poor both have
“partial justice” on their side: the rich claim they deserve more
because of their superior talents, while the poor respond that they
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 158.
Id. at 163–64.
Id. at 325.
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deserve an equal share due to their shared citizenry. One can
concede that Nozick has made a strong case for private property,
market systems, and limited private power without adopting the
intellectual absolutism that unfortunately led him to endorse
voluntary slavery—a view he later retracted.100
2.

Rawls

Ever since Plato, Western philosophy has obsessed about the
relationships between reason and passion. Emphasizing emotions,
Hobbes and Hume maintained that reason is a tool for fulfilling
motivating passions’ aspirations, never an ultimate end. As part of
his project to escape Hume’s provocative claim that “reason is . . .
the slave of the passions,”101 Kant did not adopt a theory of “pure
reason” but asserted that reason could solve most problems after a
society adopted his two moral principles of universality and not
treating people solely as means.102 Rawls modified the Kantian
vision by assimilating reason and emotion.103 When people
negotiate behind a veil of ignorance, they are no longer vulnerable
to many desires: their egalitarian status encourages them to
develop “rational preferences,”104 a phrase that sounds an awful lot
like “rational emotions.” Rawls doubled down on that argument
by claiming the same detachment would remain when people
regain their full identity when verifying his approach through
100. Id. at 290–92.
101. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 266 (David Fate Norton
& Mary J. Norton, eds., 2000).
102. One cannot just rely upon procedural rules like the Golden Rule or Kant’s
requirement of universality, because they do not preclude “might makes right.” One
can simply apply the substantive standard, “To the victor goes the spoils.” Thus, Kant’s
notions of dignity, autonomy, and treating others solely as ends provides necessary but
insufficient substance. We still need kindness. Yet Rawls and Nozick demonstrate
how radically different conceptions of morality can be derived from Kant’s principles.
A deeper conception of human nature—of mankind’s underlying emotions and
motivations—drives their “reasoned” application of Kant’s standards. This is not to
say that Kant should be discarded. It is much harder to justify genocide, nuclear war,
terrorism, racism, poverty, environmental destruction or many other odious acts if one
includes some notion of egalitarianism among one’s core moral assumptions.
103. Henry Sidgwick profoundly influenced Rawls’s methods and norms. In the
book, Sidgwick characterized Hume’s moral sense as the “primary intuitions of
reason.” HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 373 (John Rawls, Foreword,
7th ed. 1981) (1907). While it seems more accurate to describe moral reasoning as a
combination of emotional intuitions and reasoning, I would prefer to reverse the order:
moralists reason from their intuitions.
104. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 28.
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“reflective equilibrium.” However, many people may not want to
always act “fairly” to “express their nature as free and equal
rational beings.”105 Consulting their emotions and actual status,
they discover internal limits to fairness, equality, and rationality.
Conversely, they may conclude that Rawls has the argument
backward; society (including its legal, economic, and political
domains) should be based upon humane preferences and
individuals should use reason as a technique to fulfill those
emotional motivations.
Rawls conceded that his method was far from determinate; he
claimed, “it is obviously impossible to develop a substantive theory
of justice founded solely on truths of logic and definition.”106
Nevertheless, Rawls continually grounded his system in the
rhetoric of rationality. He used the phrase “rational preference”
twenty-three times in the book, perhaps because he thought his
method and proposals were so compelling that they would generate
unanimous acceptance among “reasonable people.”107
This approach seems neither psychologically accurate nor very
persuasive. For example, his explanation of ranking some rights
above others did not focus on fear or desire: “serial ordering of
principles expresses an underlying preference among primary social
goods. When this preference is rational, so likewise is the choice of
these principles in this order.”108 The first sentence’s assertion that
there is a hierarchy of rights seems noncontroversial.
Do we primarily rely upon “rationality” when deciding which
rights are more fundamental than others? In the First Amendment
area, most people think the right to dissent is far more important
than any alleged right to watch child pornography. Don’t we care
more about open discourse as an essential part of elections and
accountability than the horrific display of child abuse? The fear of
fascism is an excellent but not purely rational reason for defending
a wide range of expressive activities and advocating extensive
procedural protections in criminal cases.
First Amendment
doctrine contains many doctrinal hierarchies that are “serial
105. Id. at 252.
106. Id. at 51.
107. Rawls later conceded that not everyone would accept either his process or
all his outcomes. Rather, a “well-ordered society” would exist so long as there was an
“overlapping consensus” about a “publicly recognized conception of justice.” JUSTICE
AS FAIRNESS, supra note 39, at 35–36.
108. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 63.
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ordering of principles.”109 Emotionally generated sexual values
underlie the Supreme Court’s conclusion that there is no right to
watch child pornography,110 but there is a right for homosexuals to
engage in consensual sex.111
We have already seen how Nozick inferred from Kant
radically different “rational preferences” to create a profoundly
different social order from Rawls. The great moral philosopher
Henry Sidgwick, who influenced Rawls in multiple ways,
reluctantly concluded there are two competing “primary intuitions
of reason” that cannot always be reconciled.112 There is the
utilitarian goal of providing as much happiness as possible to all
sentient beings and the individual person’s desire to flourish. From
that perspective, Rawls developed his model of the social good as a
variant of Sidgwick’s Kantian utilitarianism that included a
commitment to the common good as well as individual autonomy,
while Nozick tried to convert the good of individual sovereignty
into an absolute.
Perhaps Rawls and Nozick had such murky views of emotions
because they were obsessed with “reason,” which is not surprising
for two of the greatest academic philosophers of all time, both
under Kant’s illuminating but arid influence. Having conceived
novel models, they wanted to turn their systems into “absolutes,” a
process that encouraged them to draw strong inferences that
superficially appeared more reasonable than emotional. These
highly abstract, universalistic celebrations of “reason” blended
easily into corporate America’s neoclassical economic ideology,
which claims that the free market status quo is not only optimally
efficient but also is optimally rational.
Sadly, excessive
commitments to rationality and certainty fail to address life’s
complex messiness. In fact, Sidgwick’s enduring tension between
individual autonomy and societal functionality creates space for
flexibility. The Eastern circle of yin and yang is a more desirable
and accurate description of the human condition than the rigid
hierarchies of monotheistic methodologies.
109. Id.
110. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
111. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
112. At the end of his book, Sidgwick seemed almost despondent when
acknowledging that his dazzling reasoning abilities could not refute the skeptical claims
that there is no single absolute, well-reasoned conception of justice because we base
our moral philosophy on our “strong dispositions.” SIDGWICK, supra note 103, at 509.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

526

3.

[Vol. 39:499

Contemporary Corporate Culture

Private power institutionalizes avarice within and without the
corporate structure. Management frequently extracts as much
wealth and income as possible from shareholders. The two groups
then band together, seeking as much profit as possible from
consumers, taxpayers, and the environment.
Aristotle observed that every society creates an ideal type of
“citizen” to perpetuate the system. In America, compliant,
addicted worker-consumers are preferred to informed, involved
citizens. Corporations produce pervasive advertising to create
consumers who prefer consumption to education and civic virtue.
Political ads are so vicious and uninformative that they all but
exclude anybody aside from shameless grifters.
It is easy to see the attraction of Nozick’s libertarianism to the
corporate elite and their advocates. Public power is presumptively
illegitimate, dangerous, and ineffective. The government does not
operate by a preferred “invisible hand,” disrupting the allegedly
superior method of unregulated capitalism.
Because the
government has few legitimate powers, there will not be many
taxes or regulations.
His intricate philosophy became a
sophisticated, intellectual justification for Ayn Rand’s more callous
libertarianism that celebrates leaders as the sole source of wealth.113
In actuality, private power found Nozick’s minimal state not to
be minimal enough. The Supreme Court doctrine protects many
fraudulent and criminal corporate actions, particularly involving
securities actions in federal court.114 Many law and economics
theorists do not believe that fraud can even exist.115 Irrespective of
statutory text or technical doctrine, intent has become the ultimate
113. See AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD (Bobs Merrill eds., 1943); AYN
RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (Random House eds., 1957).
114. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level
Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no
executive-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/ZAB6-GZ6K]. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court recently made it easier for security fraud plaintiffs to file in state court.
See generally, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562
(2016).
115. Alan Greenspan, a disciple of Ayn Rand, allegedly told Brooksley Born, “I
don’t think there is any need for a law against fraud.” Greenspan thought the market
would protect everyone. Rick Schmitt, Prophet and Loss, STANFORD ALUMNI
(March/April
2009),
http://alumni.stanford.edu/get/page/magazine/article/
?article_id=30885 [https://perma.cc/5PRC-ARLD].
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defense for the powerful.116 Corporations shift dispute regulation
to private arbitration, a process that favors their interests.117
Private power has gutted full compensation through tort reform.
Rich people have an informal immunity against serious
punishment. The billionaire Jeffrey Epstein, a friend of Bill
Clinton and Donald Trump, sexually preyed on young girls but was
only sentenced to thirteen months in prison.118 Above all, the
federal government appears to be unwilling to indict any bankers
for fraud or other criminal activities (such as drug money
laundering).119
Rawls’s Difference and Opportunity Principles appear to be
counterarguments to private power but can be easily converted into
a defense of corporate libertarianism. Neoclassical economics
arguably satisfies Rawls’ abstract requirement of Pareto optimality.
If one assumes that deregulated “free markets” are in a perpetual
equilibrium and thus are always Pareto optimal, one can then argue
that corporate capitalism not only produces the most goods and
services for the least cost but also provides the most income,
wealth, and opportunity for those who are worst off. “Trickle
down economics” becomes the purest Difference and Opportunity
Principle.120
4.

The Buddha and “Righteous Wealth”

While the Buddha thought that an austere monastic life
provided the most direct path to enlightenment, he maintained that
dedicated “householders” could also achieve nirvana. Their moral
code was not as demanding; they could obtain “righteous wealth”
by selling worthwhile products produced by well-treated

116. James G. Wilson, Does Centralized Power Corrode the Rule of Law, 64
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 157, 179 (2016).
117. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
118. Rachel Stockman, The Shameful Way Feds Protected Convicted Pedophile
Billionaire Jeffrey Epstein, LAWNEWZ (May 22, 2016). http://lawnewz.com/high
profile/the-shameful-way-feds-protected-convicted-pedophile-billionaire-jeffrey
epstein/ [https://perma.cc/S7BP-NGXV].
119. Wilson, supra note 116.
120. The economist Arthur Laffer supplemented Nozick’s moral libertarianism
by arguing that wealth is created by the few and flows down to the many. Thus, taxing
the rich impoverishes the poor. Laffer Curve, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Laffer_curve (last visited May 29, 2017). Critics have labeled such schemes as
“Trickle Down Economics.”
Trickle-down Economics, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickle-down_economics (last visited May 29, 2017).
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employees.121 In particular, followers should not sell poisons,
intoxicating products, or weapons. Sadly, we are polluting land,
sea, and air with toxins. The United States currently has the largest
military in the world and is the world’s biggest purveyor of
weapons to other countries.122 Widespread obesity is just one
example of the triumph of addictive consumerism over disciplined
common sense.
C. Delusion
The American corporate system does not just manufacture
consent about external political enemies, it also promotes modes of
delusion extending far beyond Engel’s conception of “false
consciousness,” which described the working class’s allegedly
deluded belief that capitalism benefitted them.123 Greed and
aversion are two sides of a biologically inherited delusion predating
all economic systems. We think we will be happy by avoiding pain
and obtaining pleasure. The commercial propaganda campaign
turns basic necessities, luxuries, and wholesome distractions into
compulsive addictions.
Every advertisement hints that the
consumer is special, a person to be wooed and admired. All the
amazing television and all those dazzling movies are produced just
for you.
Delusion extends beyond a flawed understanding of human
motivations that encourages one to excessively elevate sensual
pleasures and earthly powers over the joys of friendship,
contemplation, and intellectual growth. Exxon spent millions to
combat the evidence supporting the hypothesis that we are facing
radical climate change. Tobacco, food, and drug companies pay
scientists to create controversies where none exists.124 The soft
121. THE BUDDHA, Adiya Sutta, in NUMERICAL DISCOURSES, supra note 61, at
665–67.
122. In 2014, the United States sold thirty-one percent of all exported arms.
PIETER D. WEZEMAN & SIEMON T. WEZEMAN, SIPRI, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARMS TRANSFERS, 2014 (March 2015), http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1503.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SU99-DVUU].
123. Letter from Frederick Engels to Franz Mehring (July 14, 1893),
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1893/letters/93_07_14.htm
[https://
perma.cc/UVF9-QGEX].
124. Marion Nestle, Coca-Cola Says Its Drinks Don’t Cause Obesity. Science
Says Otherwise, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2015/aug/11/coca-cola-obesity-health-studies [https://perma.cc/7X7M
SAT2].
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drink industry is still putting out “studies” concluding that their
products are harmless.125 Americans are constantly told their
society is exceptional while upward mobility, labor force
participation, and the middle class continue to shrink compared to
many other nations.
Delusion does not play a major role in neoclassical economics,
Nozick, or Rawls. People can’t be greedy or ignorant because
everybody rationally maximizes their preferences. Furthermore,
homo economicus is fully informed, another dangerous fiction.
Consequently, there can be “irrationality” about choice of means
but no “delusions” about choice of ends. Meanwhile, Rawls’
citizens abide by “rational preferences.”
D. Kindness, Love, Duty, and Sacrifice
Intellectual history provides many perspectives on cultural
evolution; it is interesting to determine which parts of seminal
books fade into the background and which sections continually
resonate. In the final part of his book, Nozick proposed a utopia
consisting of a wide range of voluntary, non-coercive subgroups,
but most scholarship focused on his defense of the minimal state.126
Rawls’ last section on the “Theory of the Good” considered the
relationship of ethics to justice,127 but his book is primarily
remembered for its social contract methodology and results. In
other words, foundational books or articles create a few useful
tropes and principles that interact with a culture’s ever-changing
collective common sense. The “minimal state,” “absolute property
rights,” “individual sovereignty,” “core civil rights,” “anti
discrimination principles,” and the “[d]ifference and [o]pportunity
principles” could be easily assimilated into neoliberalism’s defense
of centralized private power. Discussions of love, utopia, and
benevolence tend to be ignored.
This section argues that Rawls and Nozick’s analysis of love
and goodness are unsatisfactory. Each of them only mentioned
“compassion” once. By contrasting their conceptions of love with
the Buddha’s four-pronged conception of kindness, we see the
desperate need for spiritual practices of kindness within the
individual, institutional, legal, and societal domains. If
125.
126.
127.

Id.
NOZICK, supra note 1, at 297–334.
RAWLS, supra note 2, at 347–514.
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corporations’ commitment to profit maximization, a principle
reinforced by the perpetual threat of Wall Street-financed mergers
and acquisitions, requires most private productive organizations to
be primarily committed to stimulating greed and fear, then we must
limit their power by creating institutional counterweights and
promoting norms committed to treating others with kindness.
1.

Nozick

While Nozick remained a fierce defender of loosely regulated
markets, he also envisioned a utopia of subcultures in which the
narrow, circular apparition of neoclassical economics need not be
the predominate force. People could agree to form sub-groups,
such as communes or churches that might operate under a wide
range of non-coercive principles.128 Nozick did not foresee how
unregulated private power would eventually gain so much control
of states and societies through advertising, economic control of
resources, and employment that it created less cultural diversity
throughout the world.
Nozick used “love” to defend libertarianism by praising the
autonomy of families.129 Many people work hard not just for
themselves but also for family members.
These laudable,
understandable goals threaten any theory of political economy that
mandates income and wealth distributions. While there is partial
justice in his argument, it does not necessarily follow that
individuals or families should have the right to accumulate
unlimited, extraordinary amounts of wealth.
2.

Rawls

Rawls supplemented his more famous “theory of justice” with
a psychologically richer “theory of the good”130 which appropriately
blurred the distinction between politics and ethics. In addition to
deciding rationally to comply with duties formulated under his
detailed social contract, people will be inclined to adopt its precepts
to avoid negative emotions, the conscience’s sanction of shame and
the fear of “righteous anger or the possibility of reprisal.”131 In

128. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 309–12.
129. Id. at 176.
130. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 395–404.
131. Id. at 445. Venality finally makes an appearance; Rawls insightfully
explored between the unjust, bad, and evil individuals. Id. at 439.
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other words, Rawls opened his methodology to a much wider range
of emotions.
Numerous references to “love” in the second half of his book
can be somewhat misleading. While “love” has universalistic
implications, the word also refers to sexual, passionate, and
intimate motivations. Nozick described love as historical and
particular (the opposite of Kantian universalism).132 Most people
cannot love strangers more than family members or close friends.
In the political domain, love is usually too much to ask for, much
less expect: kindness and generosity, tempered by the egalitarian
sentiment of equanimity, can be achieved. We can never expect
everyone to love everyone else, but we can encourage kind actions
and attitudes.
Perhaps because Rawls emphasized love instead of kindness
and compassion, he tended to limit humanitarian actions to
extraordinary deeds, such as a soldier sacrificing his or her life to
save others. Consider this discussion of “supererogatory acts,” a
term suggesting rarity by including the term “super”:
These are acts of benevolence and mercy, of heroism and selfsacrifice. It is good to do these actions but it is not one’s duty or
obligation. Supererogatory acts are not required, though
normally they would be were not the loss or risk involved for
the agent himself. A person who does a supererogatory act
does not invoke the exemption which natural duties allow. For
while we have a natural duty to bring about a great good, say, if
we can do so relatively easily, we are released from that duty
when the costs to ourselves is considerable.133

This passage is packed with insights and puzzles. Are there
not “natural” duties and “natural” obligations to take care of one’s
family members, both legal and moral requirements that most of us
struggle to satisfy? Often, the economic and psychological costs of
family responsibilities are considerable. Good parenting is an
intense spiritual practice that requires not just love but also
benevolence, mercy, and sacrifice.
In the last section of his book, Rawls converts the “self
interest” that is usually the primary motivator in contract
negotiations into more humane sentiments.
A particular

132.
133.

NOZICK, supra note 1, at 168.
RAWLS, supra note 2, at 117.
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psychology that seems quite purposeful becomes central. His
principles turn into tools of decency: “the moral sentiments are
continuous [with natural attitudes] in the sense that the love of
mankind and the desire to uphold the common good include the
principles of right and justice as necessary to define their object.”134
Elsewhere, his original principles seem to precede the content of
kindness: “The reasonableness of the underlying ethical conception
is a necessary condition; and so the appropriateness of moral
sentiments to our nature is determined by the principles that would
be consented to in the original position.”135 But we have seen how
those principles were incomplete in terms of distributions of
wealth, power, and psychological understanding. Rawls’ legalistic
proposals primarily focused on the appropriate scope of public
power, not the functions of private power and individual morality.
True compassion arises whenever the actor does not pursue a
“rational preference” maximizing their interests. A compassionate
person helps someone without expecting much or anything in
return (internally or externally).
Perhaps we have a dispute over causation as well as
definitions. Rawls appeared to claim the kindness emerged out of
his system inspired by rational preferences, while I tend to think
that kindness permeates and animates all worthwhile moral
reasoning. Rawls believed that “goodness as rationality” includes
all humane and just actions, but that potentially circular argument
only makes sense if the rationality is grounded in goodness.
“Rationality in service of goodness” seems more accurate and more
desirable. Rawls might reply that kindness was always a major part
of his system; the contractors had to do what was just and right.
While contracting behind the veil, we should not only care about
our future status but also the needs of others.
However, that concession appears to require major alterations
of his original position. Earlier in the book, Rawls said his theory
was not teleological.136 But kindness is extremely purposeful: one is
trying to improve the life of others. He also wrote that his system
does not require self-sacrifice,137 a fundamental element of true
134. Id. at 489.
135. Id. at 490.
136. Id. at 30.
137. Id. at 500. Neither man adequately explored the problem of war. Arguably,
there can never be a draft because it would be coercive. See generally NOZICK, supra
note 1. And a draft requires “self sacrifice for the common good.” See generally
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compassion. But as the book evolves, Rawls’ contractors were
never optimizing personal interests.
Finally, incorporating
kindness reprises a recurring critique of Rawls: if we include
kindness behind the veil of ignorance, why not greed, fear,
ambition, or other social emotions?
Ronald Dworkin apparently acknowledged these conundrums
by proposing that our society, including the legal system, be
grounded in “equal concern and respect.”138 That phrase intimates
a desirable dualism. First, we should care about others’ happiness,
wishing that everyone may be safe, well, happy, and live with ease.
But we also ought to respect each person by acknowledging
autonomy and individual sovereignty, giving every individual
ample but not infinite room to pursue their chosen conception of
the good. To use Sidgwick’s framework once again, Dworkin’s
phrase acknowledges the “reasonableness” of bounded
utilitarianism that seeks to increase the betterment of all beings, to
respectfully not consider others solely as means, and to provide
room for each individual “reasonably” to advance many of their
preferences. As a result, many political issues are inherently
difficult: “But in the rarer cases of a recognized conflict between
self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself,
would cease to be a motive for either side; the conflict would have
to be decided by the comparative preponderance of one or other of
two groups of non-rational impulses.”139
3.

The Institutionalization of Kindness

In The Republic, Plato equated individual and social morality;
what was good or harmful for society would have identical effects
on people.140 Machiavelli annihilated this moral equivalence by
arguing that the state’s morality must be more violent and
aggressive.141 States authorize murder whenever going to war.
Even if individual and collective moralities differ, a social system
becomes unstable or profoundly immoral if it fails to
RAWLS, supra note 2. I would like to live in a world where a draft was never needed,
just as I would like to be a pacifist and a Communist. But Hobbes prevents such
sentimentality.
138. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 7 (1977).
139. SIDGWICK, supra note 103, at 508.
140. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 58 (Robin Waterfield trans., 1993).
141. See generally NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Quentin Skinner &
Russell Price, eds., Cambridge University Press 1989) (1532).
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institutionalize the entire range of human motivations and/or fails
to provide opportunities for the wide range of personality types
that provide necessary diversity within human tribes.
If one conceives of institutions as repositories and reflections
of collective emotions, the state controls fear and greed through
violence; private corporations promote fear, greed, and delusion
while also providing vital jobs, services, and products; and kindness
can primarily be found in the innumerable gentle actions of
individuals, public social welfare programs, corporate charitable
activities, and charitable non-profit institutions. By themselves,
private for-profit corporations are institutionally incapable of
creating a culture that is sufficiently stable or humane. Wall Street
takeover artists will purchase any business that is “too generous” in
its treatment of employees, customers, or the surrounding
environment. In other words, private power often provides
worthwhile jobs, goods, and services at low cost but primarily
reflects the constricted view of human nature imbedded in
neoclassical economics.
It is hard, perhaps paradoxical, to use the state to support the
institutionalization of benevolence. By definition, one cannot be
coerced to be voluntarily kind. Nozick would assert that the state
could only use the coercive tax code to support the state’s limited
power to combat violence and fraud. Ronald Regan’s famous quip
sums up the libertarian position: “the nine most terrifying words in
the English language are: ‘I’m from the government and I’m here
to help.’”142 Once the government mandates kindness by taxing
some to help others, it creates the precedent for other goals,
including corporate capture. There are also Kant’s concern that
state paternalism infantilizes citizens143 and Schopenhauer’s fear
that mandatory kindness is often a precursor to moral inquisition.144
142. Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Remarks to
Representatives of the Future Farmers of America (July 28, 1988), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36169 [https://perma.cc/W27M-7RX4]. I can think
of many more dangerous words, such as “I am taking your life because you are black,
atheist, Christian, etc.”
143. IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory,
but it Does Not Apply in Practice’, in KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS supra note 16, at
74. Kant sounded like Reagan when he said that a benevolent government would be
the “most despotic.” Id. On the other hand, he was wary of extreme wealth disparity.
Id. at 76. He also thought some resources could be distributed to enable people to
protect the country. Id. at 80.
144. SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 71, at 153.
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Once again, we see that practical reason cannot resolve such
recurring dilemmas by itself.145
Religious institutions, libraries, hospitals, educational
institutions, non-profit foundations, and unions can institutionalize
decency to some degree. Sadly, these institutions are often
corroded by greed, fanaticism, or external threats. America’s more
callous leaders proudly attack teachers, nurses, and public
employees, claiming they are the most dangerous and selfish
people in society.146 Many universities have created a corporate
culture designed to turn academics into a compliant, underpaid
workforce.147
Unions have lost influence due to internal
corruption, lack of organizing, reduced power, and a hostile legal
system.
Perhaps four specific recommendations can demonstrate why
we sometimes need coercion to institutionalize institutions and
laws that advance kindness. Even Schopenhauer agreed that the
state could outlaw cruelty to animals for humanitarian reasons.148
Next, some people oppose charitable tax deductions because they
must pay more taxes than otherwise. But that relatively neutral
law enables many nonprofit institutions to survive and provide a
counterweight to excessive private power. Third, the Federal
Reserve Board is the “lender of last resort,” a phrase that
obscurely describes its willingness to subsidize large banks and
corporations with trillions of dollars whenever they screw up.149
The government should also be the “employer of last resort” by
providing more employment opportunities within the public and
private spheres.
145. Peter Singer has wrestled with the legal and moral dimensions of
benevolence. See generally PETER SINGER, ETHICS IN THE REAL WORLD: 82 BRIEF
ESSAYS ON THINGS THAT MATTER (2016).
146. Chris Christie told one critical elementary teacher that he was “tired of you
people” and that the American Federation of Teachers union deserved to be punched
in the face. Lyndsey Layton, Chris Christie to Teachers Union: You Deserve a Punch
in the Face, THE WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/chris-christie-to-teachers-union-you-deserve-a-punch-in-the-face/2015/
08/03/86358c2c-39de-11e5-8e98-115a3cf7d7ae_story.html?utm_term=.6dd3eb6fca99
[https://perma.cc/X5XW-TQJG].
147. BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE FALL OF THE FACULTY: THE RISE OF THE
ALL-ADMINISTRATIVE UNIVERSITY AND WHY IT MATTERS 131–66 (2011).
148. SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 71, at 180.
149. Matt Taibbi, The Real Housewives of Wall Street, ROLLING STONE (Apr.
12, 2011), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-real-housewives-of-wall-street
look-whos-cashing-in-on-the-bailout-20110411 [https://perma.cc/W98J-9F55].
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The government should also violate libertarian principles by
calculating and paying the payroll taxes of most small businesses as
long as they pay all their low-level employees a living wage.150 The
rapid decline in labor force participation not only signifies
economic decline but also widespread distress. Most people want
to be needed, to be useful members of their society.
All these policies can be defended using arguments based
upon self-interest: humane institutions not only help everyone at
various times in their lives, but they also provide social stability and
a counterweight to centralized public and private power.
Nevertheless, kindness should not be a disqualifying motivation,
anymore than the Ten Commandments provide some people with a
religious reason to oppose murder. We can’t force people to be
kind, but we can force them to support kindness.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to demonstrate how easily
neoclassical economic theory, the ideological backbone of
concentrated and centralized private power, can capture the
brilliant philosophical explorations of Rawls and Nozick.
America’s elite could ignore Rawls’s wariness of wealth inequality
and commitment to decency as well as Nozick’s opposition to
corporate welfare and criminalization of fraud.
Nozick’s
deregulatory skepticism combined with Rawls’s civil liberties and
anti-discrimination principles to create a moral framework that
justifies the modern political economy.
But there is a far more dangerous, anti-democratic ideology
thriving within the corridors of public and private power. Many
leaders believe in subordination, perceiving democracy as a
continual threat to their wealth and power. Libertarianism can be
stripped down to a “free market” that permits the wealthy to do
whatever they want. It does not matter if they injure or cheat
others. This authoritarian libertarianism does not include basic
civil liberties, such as the rights to vote and dissent. In a television
interview, Wall Street financier Larry Fink observed that “markets
[are] like totalitarian governments.”151
150. I hope to write a law review article on this proposal with Professor John
Plecnik.
151. Head of World’s Largest Asset Manager: Markets Like Totalitarian
Governments, WASHINGTON’S BLOG (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/
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Some readers might be inclined to dismiss Fink’s comment as a
joke or hyperbole, but some recent polls indicate a growing
contempt for democracy, particularly among the young.152 When
asked if it were essential to live in a democracy, thirty percent of
those born in the 1980s said “no.”153 A slightly smaller percentage
stated that democracy is a “bad” system.154 Sixteen percent of all
Americans believe it would be “good” if the military ran
America.155
These frightening developments are occurring
throughout the Western world, which has been under the thrall of
corporate neoliberalism for decades.
Confirming Aristotle’s
warning that the wealthy are the biggest internal threat to a
republic, illiberal views exist more frequently among wealthy (and
generally more schooled) younger citizens.156 Meanwhile, greed
continues to dissolve all other adhesives (including kindness). The
poor and middle class live under a system that protects the rich,
while the rich fear a political system that could become more
redistributive.
If these gloomy surveys are accurate, and if popular support
for democracy continues to diminish, classical republican theory
and Buddhist psychology have more to teach us than Rawls,
Nozick, and neoclassical economics. Quite simply, extreme wealth
disparity creates a culture of corruption that leads to crime,
demagoguery, revolution, and eventually tyranny. We need more
firm but gentle hands.

2011/03/head-of-worlds-largest-asset-manager-markets-like-totalitarian
governments.html [https://perma.cc/F9G3-6Z9U].
152. Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Democratic Disconnect, 27 J.
DEMOCRACY 5, 7–8 (2016), http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/
Foa%26Mounk-27-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7KU-UMRZ].
153. Id. at 7–9.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 12.
156. Id. at 13.

